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impairment. Because the Corps provided evidence from both the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality and its own experts that showed that the
river is an impaired body of water, the district court found that the Corps satisfied the court of appeals' mandate to consider the condition of the relevant navigable water.
The district court next considered evidence regarding the flow of the river's
tributaries. The district court interpreted Precon's next objection to be that the
Corps relied upon hypothetical rather than actual flow rates and, thus, such data
was meaningless. However, the district court found that the Corps' reliance on
hypothetical flow rates was appropriate and rational. Due to the lack of flow
gauges in the river, the Corps had no actual flow rates, making a direct comparison of the flows from the river and the ditch impossible. The district court
found that the Corps appropriately analyzed the available data points on the
wetland and the navigable waterway and properly incorporated this information
into the significant nexus determination. As the court of appeals instructed, the
district court applied Skidmore deference and agreed that the analysis possessed
the power to persuade.
Finally, the district court considered the Corps' findings regarding the functions of the wetlands in relation to the tributaries and the river. Precon argued
that the Corps' experts simply expressed their opinions rather than provided
quantitative and qualitative evidence to support a finding of a significant nexus.
The district court found this objection meritless. The district court found that
the Corps properly engaged in a lengthy discussion about the scientific validity
of Precon's expert's findings and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The district
court determined that Precon fundamentally misunderstood the district court's
role when faced with divergent expert opinions. The district court relied upon
the reasoning in Marsh v. Oregon NaturalResource Council, which states that
courts should defer to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies. The Corps' administrative record also emphasized the wetlands' ability to
support wildlife and the role tributaries performed in regulating water flows and
quality. The district court therefore found that the Corps provided ample persuasive support for its finding of a significant nexus between the relevant wetlands and the river. The district court found that the Corps' determination was
not arbitrary and capricious and that the ultimate determination of a significant
nexus was highly persuasive.
Accordingly, the court adopted the magistrate judge's R&R, granted the
Corps' motion for summary judgment, and denied Precon's motion for summary judgment.
LIhe Parker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF WYOMING
United States v. Hamilton, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Wyo. 2013) (finding
on a motion for partial summary judgment that (i) no genuine dispute existed
that Slick Creek is a water of the United States subject to the Clean Water Act;
but (ii) a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether Hamilton's
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farming activities precluded application of the Clean Water Act's recapture provision).
This is a case of first instance before the United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming ("court") regarding David Hamilton's activities when he
filled part of Slick Creek ("Creek") and altered the course of the Creek's progression. The Government brought suit against Hamilton under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") because Hamilton filled the Creek without first obtaining a
discharge permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). The Government filed for summary judgment on its prima facie case. Hamilton contested
two major issues: (i) whether Slick Creek is a water of the United States subject
to the CWA and (ii) whether his filling activities were subject to any of the exemptions to the CWA's permit requirements.
Slick Creek is a waterway sourced mainly by irrigation runoff but also from
natural rainfall and melted snow. The Creek runs from Worland, Wyoming
into the Big Horn River, which flows into the Yellowstone River and eventually
the Missouri River. In 2005 Hamilton diverted the Creek so that it would run
through a straight channel across his property. He then filled in the Creek's
previous watercourse with dirt and rock material. This allowed him to plant
new crops where the Creek used to flow. The EPA subsequently discovered
that Hamilton filled the Creek without the discharge permit required under 33
U.S.C. S 1311(a). The EPA then sent a compliance order to Hamilton but he
refused to return the Creek to its previous condition. Consequently, the Government filed suit and sought summary judgment to compel Hamilton to restore
the Creek and pay civil fines.
The court first considered whether the Government was entitled to summary judgment on the determinative issue of whether the Creek was a navigable
water of the United States. The court concluded that the Creek meets the requirements of a water of the United States under the Rapanos v. UnitedStates
plurality test because, as the Government contended, it is a "relatively permanent, flowing body of water that connects to a traditional interstate navigable
water."
The court agreed with the Government because the evidence showed that
the Creek had been full every year since 1962 and lacked vegetation along the
waterway, as is consistent with yearly water flow. The court also concluded the
Creek connected to a navigable waterway because the Creek drains into the Big
Horn River, which is navigable in fact. The court rejected Hamilton's argument
that the Creek was manmade because farming irrigation providing most of its
water. The court noted that prior precedent-namely, Rapanos-establishes that
manmade water bodies can be waters of the United States. Additionally, the
court rejected Hamilton's argument that the Creek is not permanent because it
fluctuates with farmers' irrigation activities by noting that, regardless of the
changing volume of flow, the Creek flowed continuously year-round. Consequently, the court granted the Government's request for summary judgment on
this issue because the Creek is navigable and therefore subject to the CWA.
The court next considered whether Hamilton was liable under the "recapture" provision of the CWA. The CWA contains exceptions for farmers carrying out normal activities and for the maintenance of irrigation ditches. Hamilton
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argued his actions fell under both of these exceptions. The Government, however, argued that the CWA's "recapture" provision trumps the exceptions in
this case. The CWA recapture provision requires that, even if farmers' normal
activities and irrigation maintenance are exempted, they must obtain a discharge
permit if such activity brings an area of the navigable waters into a new use that
impairs water flow. Hamilton presented testimony that prior landowners used
the filled portions of the Creek for farming activities. The court concluded that,
given this evidence, it was still disputable whether the land Hamilton filled was
previously farmland and, therefore, whether the recapture provision applied.
Accordingly, the court granted the Government's request for summary judgment in part and found that the Creek is a water of the United States. However,
the court denied the Government's request for summary judgment on the applicability of the CWA's recapture provision.
Lauren Hammond

STATE COURTS
COLORADO
Pawnee Well Users, Inc. v. Wolfe, 320 P.3d 320 (Colo. 2013) (holding the
water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule
because the General Assembly granted the State Engineer the authority to adopt
rules governing nontributary groundwater extracted during oil and gas production, and the State Engineer can neither establish nor divest himself of statutory
authority).
This case was an appeal from a final judgment issued in Colorado District
Court, Water Division 1 ("water court"), which found that the Tribal Rule
stripped the Office of the State Engineer ("State Engineer") of the authority to
enact the Fruitland Rule and, thus, the Fruitland Rule was invalid. The State
Engineer, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe ("Tribe"), and several other intervenors appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado ("Court").
In Vance v. Wolfe, the Court held that water extracted during the course of
coalbed methane ("CBM") production was subject not only to Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC") regulations, but also to both
the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 and the Colorado Ground Water Management Act ("Ground Water Act"). The Court's
holding in Vance required the State Engineer to evaluate and potentially issue
permits for more than 40,000 existing oil and gas wells within sixty days of the
decision.
To alleviate the situation, the General Assembly passed House Bill 09-1303
("H.B. 1303"), which gave the State Engineer authority under the Ground Water Act to adopt rules to administer the "dewatering of geologic formations by
withdrawing nontributary groundwater to facilitate or permit mining of minerals." H.B. 1303 also afforded the State Engineer additional time to evaluate the
wells and issue permits.
The State Engineer held public meetings and then filed a notice of proposed rule making. The notice of proposed rules included the State Engineer's

